N4467D Cessna 421C Aviation Accident 2009-07-08

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FATAL ACCIDENT (5) - Q4 Aviation LLC, Cessna 421C, N4467D, Gulf of Mexico, 20 miles W of Port Richey, FL, July 8, 2009.

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Accident Information

Approx. Accident Location Aircraft Fat. Aircraft Inj. Ground Fat. Ground Inj. ASN Entry
28°26'44.00"N, 83°7'21.00"W 5 0 0 0 Aviation Safety Network

Aircraft Information

Type Operator Registration Serial Number Manufacture Date
Cessna 421C Q4 Aviation LLC N4467D 421C0634 1979

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On July 8, 2009, a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle, registration N4467D, departed from Collin County Regional Airport in McKinney, Texas, en route to Tampa International Airport in Florida. The aircraft was operated by Q4 Aviation LLC as a corporate executive flight conducted under Part 91 regulations. On board were the company president Roland Schurrer, corporate pilot Steve Barrows, a marketing representative, and two business associates from Tampa. The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules, and the pilot had filed an IFR flight plan after reviewing convective weather activity along the intended route.

The aircraft departed McKinney at approximately 10:00 a.m. local time. As the flight progressed into the Gulf of Mexico airspace, it encountered a band of severe convective weather associated with a rapidly developing cumulonimbus cloud system. At 2:46 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, pilot Steve Barrows contacted Jacksonville ARTCC to report moderate to severe turbulence and downdrafts of approximately 2,000 feet per minute. The controller advised the pilot to continue straight ahead to escape the turbulence. Within the next minute, the pilot confirmed the aircraft was descending rapidly and requested a course reversal.

Shortly after being cleared to turn around, the pilot declared an emergency and transmitted that the aircraft was "upside down." These were the final transmissions from N4467D. Radar contact with the aircraft was lost as it descended below radar coverage approximately 25 nautical miles northwest of Port Richey, Florida. No further communications were received, and the aircraft did not arrive at its destination. The Coast Guard initiated search and rescue operations later that day.

That evening, a debris field approximately two miles long and 100 yards wide was discovered floating on the surface of the Gulf. A second debris field was located the following day, approximately four miles northeast of the first. Search efforts were suspended after failing to locate any survivors. Despite sonar scans detecting possible wreckage targets, poor underwater conditions and lack of definitive identification led to the termination of recovery operations. The bodies of the occupants were not recovered, and most of the aircraft wreckage remains unrecovered.

Meteorological analysis revealed that the accident occurred within a region characterized by intense convective activity. Radar imagery from the National Center for Atmospheric Research showed that the aircraft encountered echoes ranging from 35 to over 50 dBZ, indicative of heavy rain and likely hail within a mature thunderstorm cell. The aircraft's route took it directly into the most active segment of the storm, which included defined overshooting tops and a well-developed anvil cloud structure. These are typical markers of maximum storm intensity.

The Cessna 421C was equipped with multiple weather detection systems, including an onboard weather radar, a Stormscope lightning detector, and XM satellite weather data. However, the NTSB report emphasized the limitations of airborne radar systems in high-attenuation environments, especially in heavy precipitation and dense cumulonimbus clouds. Radar attenuation and precipitation shadowing can result in misleading returns, leading pilots to believe they are clear of severe cells when in fact they are approaching them. In this case, the aircraft likely penetrated the storm core inadvertently due to these limitations.

The pilot, Steve Barrows, held a commercial certificate with multi-engine and instrument ratings and had accumulated approximately 1,940 flight hours. He was 33 years old and held a valid second-class medical certificate. According to FAA records, the aircraft was in compliance with required inspections, with the last annual performed on August 18, 2008, and a maintenance log entry two days prior to the flight. The aircraft had accumulated 4,325 total hours at the time of the accident. It was powered by two Continental GTSIO-520-L engines and had been modified by RAM Aircraft with performance-enhancing upgrades including winglets and vortex generators.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of the accident to be the pilot’s decision to operate into an area of known adverse weather, which resulted in an inadvertent penetration of a severe thunderstorm. This incursion led to a loss of aircraft control and an in-flight structural breakup. The wreckage analysis and Doppler radar data supported the conclusion that the aircraft broke apart mid-air after entering the convective core, consistent with high stress loads associated with turbulence and severe updrafts or downdrafts.

ATC communication transcripts confirmed that the pilot was actively seeking weather avoidance guidance and had requested both ride reports and vectoring support. Despite the pilot’s intentions to avoid the storm, rapid storm development and possibly misleading radar interpretation contributed to the final trajectory into the storm’s most severe region. While ground-based radar operators may have had a broader view, the dynamic nature of the storm and limited time to respond likely compounded the situation.

Lisa's interpretation of the real-time NEXRAD radar flight path overlay (figure 4):

The red and white dot-track slicing west to east into that convective wall is staggering in what it confirms: a direct and tightening trajectory into a band of intensifying precipitation cells. Frame by frame, the atmospheric violence builds — dBZ returns moving from yellow-green to solid red cores, likely punching past 50 dBZ in the final echo sweep. That final red mass in Frame 4 is not just extreme convection — it’s structural failure airspace.

What strikes me hardest is how textbook it is for radar attenuation illusions. In Frame 1, you might convince yourself you see a “gap” north of KSRQ. By Frame 2–3, that gap is closing. In Frame 4, there's no ambiguity — just core-to-core storm fusion. And our track punches straight through the storm’s heart, at cruising altitude, with minimal lateral deviation.

This is what inflight breakup looks like in radar form.

This page will be updated as more information becomes available.

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