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{{main|Federal Aviation Administration#Regulatory process}} 
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[[File:FAA National Policy - Organization Designation Authorization Procedures ORDER 8100.15A.pdf|thumb|FAA document that establishes the ODA program]]
The '''Organization Designation Authorization''' (<abbr>ODA</abbr>) program was established by '''FAA Order 8100.15()''' (image at right). The ODA, in conjunction with the [[Federal Aviation Administration]] (FAA), grants [[Federal Aviation Administration#Designated Engineering Representative|airworthiness designee authority]] to organizations or companies. The regulations addressing the <abbr>ODA</abbr> program are found in [[Federal Aviation Regulations|Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations]] (14 <abbr>CFR</abbr>) part 183, subpart D, sections 183.41 through 813.67.

The ODA program's intention is to elaborate on the tasks that are available their organizations design authorizations. While adding in this "final rule" for designs, the ODA also added in a phase-out timeline for design programs.

The FAA asserted that the ODA program does not introduce any type of self-certification.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web| url=https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/10/13/05-20470/establishment-of-organization-designation-authorization-program|title=Establishment of Organization Designation Authorization Program|date=2005-10-13|website=Federal Register|access-date=2019-08-31}} {{PD-notice}}</ref> However, the practice has been criticized for substantial manufacturer influence over personnel designation and design certification, particularly after the [[Boeing 787 Dreamliner battery problems|Boeing 787 Dreamliner battery fires]] in 2013 and the [[Boeing 737 MAX groundings]] in 2019.

== Purpose ==
"The ODA program expands the scope of approved tasks available to organizational designees; increases the number of organizations eligible for organizational designee authorizations; and establishes a more comprehensive, systems-based approach to managing designated organizations."<ref name=":0" />

The ODA program was created for the FAA to standardize the operation and oversight of organizational designees.<ref name=":0" /> 

This program aims to "increase the efficiency with which the FAA appoints and oversees designee organizations, and allow the FAA to concentrate its resources on the most safety-critical matters."<ref name=":0" />

== Types of Organizational Designation Authorizations ==
The following are the different types of Organizational Designation Authorizations for which qualified organizations may apply.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/delegated_organizations/types/|title=Types of Organizational Designation Authorizations|website=www.faa.gov|language=en-us|access-date=2019-08-31}}</ref>

* [[Type certificate|Type Certification]] <abbr>ODA</abbr> (<abbr>TC</abbr> <abbr>ODA</abbr>)
* [[Supplemental type certificate|Supplemental Type Certification]] <abbr>ODA</abbr> (<abbr>STC</abbr> <abbr>ODA</abbr>)
* Production Certification <abbr>ODA</abbr> (<abbr>PC</abbr> <abbr>ODA</abbr>)
* [[Parts Manufacturer Approval]] <abbr>ODA</abbr> (<abbr>PMA</abbr> <abbr>ODA</abbr>)
* [[Technical Standard Order]] Authorization Holder <abbr>ODA</abbr> (<abbr>TSOA</abbr> <abbr>ODA</abbr>)
* Major Repair, Alteration, and Airworthiness <abbr>ODA</abbr> (<abbr>MRA</abbr> <abbr>ODA</abbr>)
* Airman Knowledge Testing <abbr>ODA</abbr> (<abbr>AKT</abbr> <abbr>ODA</abbr>)
* Air Operator <abbr>ODA</abbr> (<abbr>AO</abbr> <abbr>ODA</abbr>)

==History==
In the "VISION 100—CENTURY OF AVIATION REAUTHORIZATION ACT" of 2003, legislators passed a section entitled "DESIGN ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATES", which instructed the FAA to deputize designers, so that the designers would "certify compliance with the requirements and minimum standards... for the type certification of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances."<ref>{{cite book |title=PUBLIC LAW 108–176—DEC. 12, 2003 VISION 100—CENTURY OF AVIATION REAUTHORIZATION ACT |date=12 December 2003 |publisher=Government Publishing Office |location=Washington |url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-108publ176/pdf/PLAW-108publ176.pdf}}</ref>

In 2005, the FAA granted Boeing "in-house oversight for new planes in production and approval of major repairs and alterations".<ref name=ksoda/> The manufacturers’ engineer is delegated to review the design, plan and observe tests, and certify they meet applicable standards.<ref name=ksoda/> FAA staff do attend "many critical tests involving [[safety]] issues — such as [[flammability]] of new materials and design of [[Aircraft flight control system|flight controls]]".<ref name=ksoda/> The ODA status is granted for an aircraft manufacturer to act as the proxy on certification oversight.<ref name=jda/> Previous to the ODA programme, "engineers in that role were approved by and reported directly to the FAA".<ref name=ksoda/>

In 2011, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety Margaret Gilligan issued National Policy Order 8100.15A to establish the "procedures, guidance, and limitations of authority" the FAA grants to an organization under the ODA program. Order 8100.15A was 293 pages long and composed of 16 chapters and seven appendices. The legislative authority for the ODA program was derived under Title 49 of the [[US Code]] § 44702: '''Issuance of Certificates''', which authorized the FAA to "delegate to a qualified private person a matter related to issuing certificates, or related to the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate on behalf of the FAA Administrator".<ref name=":0" /> The FAA established the ODA program in 14 [[Code of Federal Regulations|CFR]] part 183, subpart D: Representatives of the Administrator.<ref name=o8100>{{cite web |title=U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION National Policy SUBJ: Organization Designation Authorization Procedures ORDER 8100.15A |url=https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/8100.15A.pdf |website=faa.gov |publisher=FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION}}</ref>

Boeing has 1,500 people in its ODA, under supervision by an FAA team of 45 people, of which only 24 are engineers.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2019-12-03 |title=Max Disasters Fuel Outcry Over How FAA Let Boeing Self-Certify |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-03/max-disasters-fuel-outcry-over-how-faa-let-boeing-self-certify |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191204012603/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-03/max-disasters-fuel-outcry-over-how-faa-let-boeing-self-certify |archive-date=2019-12-04 |work=Bloomberg}}</ref> By 2018, the FAA was letting Boeing certify 96 percent of its own work.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/business/boeing-737-max-faa.html|title=The Roots of Boeing's 737 Max Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes Its Oversight|last1=Kitroeff|first1=Natalie|date=July 27, 2019|work=[[The New York Times]]|first2=David |last2=Gelles|first3=Jack |last3=Nicas}}</ref>

=== Historical examples ===
The Boeing 737 series had suffered from [[Boeing 737 rudder issues|rudder issues]] in the past, resulting in several accidents. A previous model of the 737 also experienced a similar mix of questionable safety assessment, insufficient pilot training, and automated system malfunction when [[Turkish Airlines Flight 1951]] crashed.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.thedailybeast.com/boeings-responsibility-in-a-deadly-737-crash-in-2009-reportedly-got-buried|title=Boeing's Responsibility for a Deadly 737 Crash in 2009 'Got Buried': NYT|last=Tucker|first=Emma|date=2020-01-20|website=The Daily Beast|access-date=2020-01-20}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/business/boeing-737-accidents.html|title=How Boeing's Responsibility in a Deadly Crash 'Got Buried'|last=Hamby|first=Chris|date=2020-01-20|work=The New York Times|access-date=2020-01-20|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In February 2020, Boeing and [[National Transportation Safety Board|NTSB]] officials refused to cooperate with a new Dutch lawmakers inquiry.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/business/boeing-737-inquiry.html|title=Boeing Refuses to Cooperate With New Inquiry Into Deadly Crash|last1=Hamby|first1=Chris|date=2020-02-06|work=The New York Times|access-date=2020-02-07|last2=Moses|first2=Claire|issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

In November 2019, the online media ''"The Air Current"'' reviewed historical parallels between the MAX and the [[McDonnell Douglas DC-10]], which had been grounded after the crash of [[American Airlines Flight 191]].<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-11-22|title=The DC-10, 737 Max and the struggle to polish a tarnished airplane|url=https://theaircurrent.com/historical-context/the-dc-10-737-max-and-the-struggle-to-polish-a-tarnished-airplane/|access-date=2019-11-22|website=The Air Current}}</ref> A safety panel was convened by the FAA under the auspices of the [[National Academy of Sciences]] to investigate both the design of the DC-10 and the regulatory system itself. In its report, published in June 1980, the safety panel highlighted the FAA's reliance on the manufacturer during the certification process and the fact that in most cases it performs only a "cursory review" of the manufacturer's information.<ref name="aircurrent-dc10">{{Cite web|url=https://theaircurrent.com/historical-context/searching-for-40-year-old-lessons-for-boeing-in-the-grounding-of-the-dc-10/|title=Searching for 40-year old lessons for Boeing in the grounding of the DC-10|date=2019-10-15|website=The Air Current|access-date=2019-10-16}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Improving Aircraft Safety |date=June 24, 1980 |publisher=National Research Council |url=https://www.nap.edu/initiative/committee-on-faa-airworthiness-certification-procedures}}</ref> ''[[The New York Times]]'' noted that the panel found "critical deficiencies in the way the Government certifies the safety of American-built airliners".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Witkin |first1=Richard |title=U.S. Safeguards Faulted As Plane Accidents Rise; Aviation Safety First of five articles. Delegation of Authority A Three-Month Inquiry Panel, in Report to U.S., Finds Major Flaws in Certifying Aircraft Concentration on Certification Program Antedates Administrator Fatal Accidents Have Declined Many Attributed to Pilot Error Prone to Erroneous Readings Agency Prescribes Standards Prime Concern of Panel Not Enough Manpower Production-Line Derelictions Crack in Plane's Flange Cadre of Specialists Pilots Want a Voice Aviation Officials Opposed |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1980/06/19/archives/us-safeguards-faulted-as-plane-accidents-rise-aviation-safety-first.html |work=The New York Times |date=19 June 1980}}</ref>

For Marian Pistik, head of asset management at International Airfinance Corporation, the case of the MAX is unprecedented due to allegations of wrongdoings. The groundings of the DC-10 and of the [[Boeing 787 Dreamliner battery problems|Dreamliner]] could not be directly compared to the global B737 MAX grounding: "there was no suspicion that Boeing or any [[Original equipment manufacturer|OEM]] knew of the problem and tried to disguise it or […] any suspicion of wrongdoing or not being compliant or forthcoming with the issues of the 737 Max."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.businesstraveller.com/business-travel/2019/10/31/grounding-of-boeings-737-max-has-no-historic-precedent/|title=Grounding of Boeing's 737 Max has 'no historic precedent'|website=Business Traveller|access-date=2019-11-01}}</ref>

== Oversight of delegation policies by SOCAC ==
The Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC) was created by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The committee will provide advice to the Secretary of Transportation on policies related to FAA safety oversight and certification programs and activities, utilization of delegation and designation authorities.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ishn.com/articles/111322-faas-new-safety-committee-taking-shape|title=FAA's new safety committee taking shape|website=www.ishn.com|language=en|access-date=2019-09-01}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/committee/browse/committeeID/717|title=Advisory and Rulemaking Committees – Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC)|website=www.faa.gov|language=en-us|access-date=2019-09-01}}</ref>

==Controversies==
The ODA process has been criticized as  detrimental to safety.<ref name=jda>{{cite news |last1=Rioux |first1=Mike |title=Boeing Has FAA Organizational Design Approval |url=https://jdasolutions.aero/blog/boeing-has-faa-organizational-design-approval/ |publisher=JDA Journal |date=8 February 2013}}</ref> Since 2012, the FAA had successfully pushed to increase the scope of delegating safety checks to the manufacturer.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-04-14|title=With close industry ties, FAA safety chief pushed more delegation of oversight to Boeing|url=https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/with-close-industry-ties-faa-safety-chief-pushed-more-delegation-of-oversight-to-boeing/|access-date=2020-06-27|website=The Seattle Times|language=en-US}}</ref>

On 4 February 2013, an article in ''[[The Seattle Times]]'' written by journalist Kyung Song<ref name=ksoda>{{cite news |title=FAA faulted for outsourcing 787 safety checks to Boeing |url=https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/faa-faulted-for-outsourcing-787-safety-checks-to-boeing/ |publisher=Seattle Times |date=4 February 2013|quote=Lithium-ion batteries are well known for being much more flammable than older nickel-cadmium batteries, with fires that are all but impossible to extinguish until a battery's solvent-based liquid electrolytes burn out.}}</ref> critiqued the process by which the [[airworthiness certificate]] was obtained for the [[Boeing 787]] because approvals for the [[Boeing 787 Dreamliner battery problems|lithium ion battery system]] were akin "to the fox guarding the chicken coop".<ref name=jda/> In the words of an onlooker, "Song stated that [[Boeing]] became an FAA designee [sic] with wide latitude in picking the company’s own engineers to sign off on their employer’s work on behalf of the FAA".<ref name=jda/>
 
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In April 2019, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, [[Elaine L. Chao]], who boarded a [[Boeing 737 MAX|MAX]] flight on March 12 amid calls to [[Boeing 737 MAX groundings|ground the aircraft]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/13/us-transportation-secretary-elaine-chao-flies-on-boeing-737-max-8.html|title=Feeling pressure to ground Boeing planes, US Transportation Secretary flies on 737 Max 8|last=LeBeau|first=Phil|date=2019-03-13|website=CNBC|access-date=2020-01-19}}</ref> created the ''Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft Certification Process'' to review of Organization Designation Authorization, which granted Boeing authority to review systems on behalf of the FAA, during the [[Boeing 737 MAX certification|certification of the 737 MAX 8]]. The committee recommended integrating human performance factors and consider all levels of pilot experience, but defended the ODA against any reforms.<ref>{{cite news | last1=Pasztor | first1=Andy | last2=Cameron | first2=Doug | title=Panel Clears 737 MAX's Safety-Approval Process at FAA | website=[[The Wall Street Journal]] | date=16 January 2020 | url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/panel-clears-737-maxs-safety-approval-process-at-faa-11579188086 | access-date=15 February 2020|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cnet.com/news/independent-panel-says-process-for-certifying-737-max-was-safe/|title=Independent panel says process for certifying 737 Max was safe|last=German|first=Kent|website=CNET|access-date=2020-01-19}}</ref> Relatives of those on board the accident flights condemned the report for calling the ODA an "effective" process.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Leggett|first=Theo|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51153286|title=Victims' families slam report into 737 Max crashes|date=2020-01-17|work=BBC News|access-date=2020-01-19}}</ref>

In June 2020, the [[United States Senate]] criticized the FAA for failing to turn over [[Boeing 737 MAX|737 MAX]] documents and accused the FAA of trying "to keep us in the dark".<ref>{{Cite web|title=Senate Examines FAA's Certification Of Boeing's Troubled 737 Max Airplane|url=https://www.npr.org/2020/06/17/879682754/senate-examines-faas-certification-of-boeings-troubled-737-max-airplane|access-date=2020-06-27|website=NPR.org|language=en}}</ref> The [[United States Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General|U.S. Inspector General]] said that by 2017, Boeing was handling all certification checks on behalf of the FAA.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-06-30|title=Inspector General report details how Boeing played down MCAS in original 737 MAX certification – and FAA missed it|url=https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/inspector-general-report-details-how-boeing-played-down-mcas-in-original-737-max-certification-and-faa-missed-it/|access-date=2020-07-02|website=The Seattle Times|language=en-US}}</ref>

=== FAA response to criticisms of excessive delegation ===
In response to questions from [[Project On Government Oversight]],  a FAA spokesperson said  “FAA has never allowed companies to police themselves or self-certify their aircraft. With strict FAA oversight, delegation [of certification] extends the rigor of the FAA certification process to other recognized professionals, thereby multiplying the technical expertise focused on assuring an aircraft meets FAA standards.”<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2019/03/how-the-faa-ceded-aviation-safety-oversight-to-boeing/|title=How the FAA Ceded Aviation Safety Oversight to Boeing|website=Project On Government Oversight|language=en-US|access-date=2019-08-31}}</ref>

In May 2020, the FAA announced a reform of existing processes to improve management of aircraft development and corporate practices.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Whiteman|first=Lou|date=2020-05-19|title=FAA to Reform Aircraft Review Process Following 737 Max Disasters|url=https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/05/19/faa-to-reform-aircraft-review-process-following-73.aspx|access-date=2020-06-04|website=The Motley Fool|language=en}}</ref> In June 2020, a [[Senate Bill]] calling for changes to the existing ODA was being drafted to resolve potential [[conflict of interest]] between Boeing, FAA, designated representatives and [[Whistleblower|whistleblowers]]. <ref>{{Cite web|last=Cirium2020-06-03T21:31:00+01:00|title=Senate bill seeks FAA changes after 737 Max crashes|url=https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/senate-bill-seeks-faa-changes-after-737-max-crashes/138681.article|access-date=2020-06-07|website=Flight Global|language=en}}</ref> FAA Director Steve Dickenson admitted that "mistakes were made" with the 737 MAX and that the implications of MCAS were not fully understood. <ref>{{Cite web|title='Mistakes were made': US aviation body admits 737 MAX lapses|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/aviation-body-admits-737-max-lapses-200618032426772.html|access-date=2020-06-28|website=www.aljazeera.com}}</ref>

In August 2020, the FAA proposed a $1.2 million fine on Boeing for exerting undue pressure on designated inspectors to expedite aircraft approvals.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Aratani|first1=Lori|last2=Duncan|first2=Ian|title=FAA proposes $1.25 million fine for Boeing, alleging managers pressured employees to rush inspections|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/faa-proposes-125-million-fine-for-boeing-alleging-managers-pressured-employees-to-rush-inspections/2020/08/06/da2eb108-d800-11ea-9c3b-dfc394c03988_story.html|access-date=2020-08-08|date=August 6, 2020|newspaper=Washington Post|language=en}}</ref>

== Further reading ==
* {{Cite web|last=Raso|first=Connor|date=2019-12-18|title=Boeing crisis illustrates risks of delegated regulatory authority|url=https://www.brookings.edu/research/boeing-crisis-illustrates-risks-of-delegated-regulatory-authority/|access-date=2020-07-18|website=Brookings|language=en-US}}
* FAA, [https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/delegated_organizations/become/ Become an ODA].

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:Federal Aviation Administration]]
[[Category:Aviation safety]]